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ABSTRACT 
The p o s i t i v e  bene f t t r  o f  large-scale technology e f for ts  are well 
known. They enhance national prestige, con t r ibu te  t o  ecenomtc growth, 
and are an investment I n  fu tu re  progress. However, It i s  Important t o  
be aware of  the unlntanded but undestrable s ide e f f e c t s  of  big  technology, 
fn  order to deal wi th  them properly. 
t ha t  governmental technology programs become more a t t r a c t i v e  than they 
are a t  present. 
I f  we do so, the resu l *  may be 
The close, continuing re la t ionship between the Federal Government 
and i t s  major suppl iers o f  large technical systems i s  r e s u l t i n g  In a 
convergence between the two, which Is reducing much o f  the d l s t l n c t t o n  
betmen the pub l i c  and p r i v a t e  sectors. To a substantial degree, the 
government i s  taking on the t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  of the p r i v a t e  entrepreneur 
wh i le  the companies are becoming less 1Ike other corporatrans and mare 
1 lke government agencies or arsenals. 
Government procurement policies need t o  be modified fn order to 
h a l t  the eroslon o f  the basic entrepreneurIa1 character o f  the ftrrnr 
t h a t  undertake large-scale devetapmentrl progrirns f o r  government agencies. 
Second thoughts need t o  be given before we as a Nation agree t o  the 8lanost 
u n c r l t l c a l  damads f o r  sxtendfng the use of  the gwarnmcnt-ar&nt& 
carparations to other pa r t s  o f  the publ lc  sector. 
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We are a l l  wel l  acquatnted with the p o s i t i v e  benef i t s  o f  large- 
scale technology e f fo r t s .  
o f  our economy. It enhances our national prestige. It improves our 
Big technology contr ibutes t o  the growth r a t e  
understandlng o f  the world around US. I t  expands our educational f a c l l l t l e r ,  
F i n a l l y ,  i t  cons t i tu tes  an important investment i n  our fu tu re  progress, 
$oms perspective and balance i s  needed i n  any appraisal. 
Hence, now l e t  us tu rn  to  the negative aspects o f  latge-scale tech- 
nology e f f o r t s .  We may not be as wel l  acquainted w i t h  these. The Federal 
Government o f  course i s  the dominant patron o f  b i g  technology progrms. 
As we examine i t s  dealings w i t h  the p r i v a t e  indust r ies and research i n s t f t u -  
t i o n s  which execute the bu lk  o f  these government-sponsored projects, we 
f ind important negative 
important t o  be aware o f  
t o  deal w i th  them proper 
rnpacts on our economy and our society. It Is 
these unintended but undesirable ef fects ,  i n  order 
y. I f we do so, the r e s u l t  may be tha t  governmental 
technological programs become more a t t r a c t i v e  than they are a t  present. 
The close, continuing re la t ionsh ip  between the Federal government and 
the major companies working on m i l  i t a r y ,  space and re la ted high-teehnotogy 
systems i s  ac tua l l y  changing the n s t v r s o f  the pub l i c  sector o f  the 
American economy.1 
American industry. 
The re la t lonsh ip  i s  also changing a large branch o f  
To a substantial degree, the government is taking on 
the t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  o f  the p r i va te  entrepreneur whi le the companles are 
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becoming less l i k e  other American corporations and more l i k e  government 
agencies or arsenals. 
between the Federal Government and i t s  major suppliers o f  large technical  
systems i s  resu l t i ng  i n  a convergence between the two, which i s  b l u r r i n g  
and reducing much of the d i s t i n c t i o n  between publ ic  and p r i va te  a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  an important branch o f  the American economy. 
I n  a sense, the close, cont inuing re la t ionsh ip  
This tendency f o r  a convergence between the government and i t s  major 
contractors needs t o  be i i s t ingu ished from other analyses o f  the in te rac t ion  
between government and pr iva te  industry. The analysis presented here does 
not evoke the conspi rator ia l  a y r c n c h  
i ndus t r i a l  complex.lI Also, t h i s  convergence tendency i s  narrower than the 
content ion o f  Professor John Kenneth Galbra i th  that  modern large corporatlons 
are becoming pa r t  o f  the governmental admin is t ra t ive complex. As Galbre i th  
puts i t  i n  h i s  New Indus t r ia l  State, "Increasingly i t  w i l l  be recognized 
tha t  the mature corporation, as it develops, becomes pa r t  o f  the larger  
admin is t ra t ive complex associated w i t h  the state. 
the two w i l l  disappear.It2 
o f  the discussions o f  a ' h l l l t a r y -  
In  time the l i n e  between 
To the rsn t ra ry ,  I w i l l  attempt t o  demonstrate tha t  the convergence 
phenomenon here described i s  l im i ted  t o  one branch o f  American industry, 
the aerospace and s imi la r  high-technology f irms, 
t h a t  the government-oriented corporation i s  becoming measurably d i f f e ren t  
f r o m  large American business f i rms tha t  p r imar i l y  cater  t o  indus t r ta l  and 
consumer markets. 
I t w i l l  a lso be shown 
GOVERNMENT PERFORM I NG PR IVATE DEC I S ION-MAK I NG 
I n  i t s  long-term dealings wi th i t s  major suppliers o f  h igh technology 
systems, the Federal Government gradually has taken over d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  
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many of  the decision-making functions which are normally the prerogat ives 
o f  business management. 
or ac t i ve  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in,  p r iva te  decision-making can be ident i f ied :  the 
choice o f  which products the f i r m  i s  t o  produce, the source o f  cap i ta l  funds, 
and the in te rna l  operat ion o f  the f i r m .  This government involvement i n  
p r i va te  industry ar ises i n  the case of  the unique and large-scale nature o f  
m i l i t a r y  weapon system, space, and re la ted high technology procurement by 
the government. It hardly characterizes the purchases o f  standard items 
by many c i v i l i a n  government agencies through f ixed-pr ice contracts awarded 
v i a  sealed-bid competition. 
Three key aspects o f  t h i s  pub l i c  assumption o f ,  
By awarding massive contracts f o r  research and development (over $10 
b i l l i o n  i n  the f i s c a l  year 1966), the Department o f  Defense and NASA have 
come t o  s t rong ly  inf luence o r  determine which new products t h e i r  essen t ia l i y  
common group o f  contractors w i l l  design and produce. 
economy, i n  contrast ,  research and development costs normally are on l y  
recovered to the extent t ha t  they r e s u l t  i n  the sale o f  p r o f i t a b l e  products. 
Hence, the decisions t o  embark upon a product research and development 
program are made there by the se l lers ,  who bear the r i s k  o f  not  recovering 
t h e i r  technological investment. O f  course, government contractors may and 
do sponsor and fund some o f  the i r  own RED e f f o r t .  However, the bulk  o f  
t h e i r  RED i s  performed under government contract  (over 90 percent o f  the 
aerospace indus t ry 's  RCD i n  1964 was so funded).3 Much, i f  not  most, of 
the remainder i s  charged as allowable overhead on t h e i r  government contracts,  
having met the p r i o r  approval o f  cont ract  admin is t ra t ion o f f i c i a l s .  
The government also uses i t s  vast  f inanc ia l  resources to supply the 
b u l k  of the p lan t  and equipment used by i t s  major contractors and a lso a 
In  the commercial 
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major pa r t  o f  the working cap t a l  tha t  they require. A survey o f  I3 la rge 
c m t r a c t o r s  covering the year 
supplied property exceeded ths value o f  gross company property reported on 
corporate balance sheetsn4 Moreover, milch o f  the comp2n.j-owned property 
was used by the commcrcially-oriented d i v i s ions  o f  these companies, rather 
than by the d i v i s ions  working on governzant contrasts.  ;{ore recent ly,  
during the Vietnam Kar, Defe;l;e Department expenditures f o r  addi t ional  
p lan t  and equipment ta  he supplied t o  :-.$ contractors have r i sen  sharply, 
from $56 m i l l i o n  i n  the f i s c a l  ycsr 1555 to  zn sstimated $330 m i l l i o n  i n  
1967.' 
1957-1961 revealed tha t  the cost o f  government- 
' . - 
I n  addi t ion,  appro::imttF!ly $5 b i l l  {on o f  outstanding 1tprogress4' 
pa*;pnents arc? held by m i l i t a r y  c 3 n t r x t o r s .  Some ind iv idual  f i r m s  reported 
tha t  such government-supplied fur;ds exceed t h e i r  net w r t h .  
procurement regulat ions provide speci f ic  d is incent ives f o r  the use o f  p r i v a t e  
working cap i ta l .  
costs  incurred on m i l i t a r y  contracts Senerally are provided withc. i t  in te res t  
charge t o  the contractors. 
r e l y  on p r i v a t z  ssurces f o r  warking cap i ta l ,  t h e i r  in te res t  payments may 
not be ch:.rged t o  the contract ,  and hence must cone ou t  o f  t h e i r  p r o f i t s .  
Presumhbly, t h i s  arrangement resg l ts  i n  smaller t o t a l  cost  t o  the govern- 
ment because o f  the lower in terest  ra tes paid by the U.S.  Treasury on the 
funds tha t  i t  borrows. tlowever, the re 'u l t  i s  a lso t o  increase the extent 
Government 
Progress payrncnts equal t o  80 percent o r  more o f  the 
In contr,-st, should these companies decide t o  
6 
t o  which p b l i c  ra ther  than pr iva te  cap i ta l  finances the operations o f  
government contractors.  I!wce, the f i nanc ia l  stake tha t  the government 
has i n  the performaoce o f  i t s  RED suppl iers i s  increased fur ther .  
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Another and perhaps the most pervasive way i n  which the Federal 
Government assumes the management decision-making funct ions o f  these 
companies i s  through the procurement l e g i s l a t i o n  and regulat ions governing 
the contracts i t  awards. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation re- 
qu i res contracters t o  accept on a "take i t  o r  leave i t" basis many 
standard clauses i n  government contracts which give the contract ing and 
surve i l lance o f f i c e r s  numerous powers over the in ternal  operations o f  
these companies. 
from matters of  substance t o  i t e m s  so minor that  they border on the 
ludicrous. I t should be rea l ized tha t  these r e s t r i c t i o n s  general ly have 
been imposed to  prevent spec i f i c  abuses which may ar ise.  
These u n i l a t e r a l l y  determined grants o f  au thor i ty  vary 
However, the cumulative and long-term impacts on company i n i t i a t i v e  
Viewed as a t o t a l  i t y ,  these and entrepreneurship are r a r e l y  considered, 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  represent a P-w form o f  government regulat ion o f  industry. 
This regulat ion i s  not accomplished through the t r a d i t i o n a l  independent 
regulatory  commission, but rather through the u n i l a t e r a l  exercise o f  the 
government's monopsonistic market power. 
The au thor i ty  assumed by the government includes power to review and 
veto company decisions as to  which a c t i v i t i e s  these companies may perform 
in-house and which they may subcontract, which f i rms t o  use as subcontractors, 
which products t o  buy domestically rather than to  import, what in te rna l  
f inanc ia l  repor t ing systems t o  establ ish,  what type o f  i ndus t r i a l  engineering 
and planning system to u t i l i z e ,  what minimum as wel l  as average wage rates 
to pay, how much overtime work to  authorize, and so for th.7 
My favo r i t e  example of the more minor matters covered i n  the  de ta i led  
and voluminous m i l i t a r y  procurement regulat ions i s  the p resc r ip t i on  tha t  
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the safety ru les  followed i n  the o f f i c e s  and fac to r ies  o f  the contractors 
must be consistent w i th  the l a tes t  e d i t i o n  o f  the Corps o f  Engineers 
safety manual .8 The whole philosophy o f  c lose government review of the 
in ternal  operations o f  i t s  contractprs i s  so deeply imbedded tha t  inser t ion  
of  statements such as the fol lowing i n  the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation evoke no publ ic  o r  industry reaction: 
"Although the Government does not expect t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
every management decision, i t  may reserve the r i g h t  t o  review 
the contractor I s  management ef for ts . .  .Ii9 
O f  course, many have contended tha t  cost-plus government contract ing 
has sh i f t ed  much of  the r isk-bearing from the i ndus t r i a l  s e l l e r  t o  the 
governmental buyer. The use o f  f ixed p r i c e  contracts has increased i n  
recent years, However, a major share o f  m i l i t a r y  contracts  s t i l l  i s  on a 
cost  reimbursement basis. So long as t h i s  remains the case, the government 
determines which items o f  cost are l'allowable't as charges t o  the contract  
and hence, for  most p rac t i ca l  purposes, which a c t i v i t i e s  and which items 
of expenditure the company can undertake. 
disal lowed costs d i r e c t l y  reduce company net p r o f i t s .  
This r e s u l t  obtains because 
It needs t o  be kept i n  mind tha t  the industry-government re la t ionsh ip  
i s  a dynamic one. Numerous changes are made i n  government procurement 
regulat ions i n  the course o f  a year, many o f  them extending the r o l e  o f  the 
government i n  the in te rna l  operations o f  the contractors. The l i s t  o f  
unallowable costs o f  defense contractors was lengthened dur ing the years 
1953-1961 to include technical  displays unapproved overtime, business 
conferences, b i d  and proposal expense, employee moving expense, fore ign 
o f f i c e  expense, operation o f  executive airplanes, and pub l ic  re la t ions.  10 
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A review o f  rev is ions i n  the Armed Services Procurement Regulation 
i n  more recent years confirms the cont inuat ion o f  t h i s  pa t te rn  o f  increased 
governmental involvement i n  the internal  decision-making o f  the contractors. 
The fo l l cw ing  i s  a sample o f  such recent changes: 
1. I n  contracts f o r  a i r c r a f t  t i r e s ,  the contractor must purchase an 
amount o f  rubber from the government's s tockp i le  equal t o  a t  least  50 percent 
of the value o f  the contrsct .  The contractor  does not ac tua l l y  have to  use 
the rubber from the s tockpi le  i n  f i l l i n g  the government contract .  He can 
keep i t  f o r  h i s  commercial work. Such t i e - i n  contracts, i f  made between 
two p r i va te  f i r m s ,  wogld run &foul o f  the a n t i - t r u s t  laws. 
2. S i m i l a r  requirement; must be met i n  the case o f  cont ractors  providing 
aluminum products. 
3.  M i l i t a r y  contractors must b*:y a l l  o f  t h e i r  jewel bearings from the 
Government-owned T u r t l e  Mountain Bearirig Plant e t  Rol la,  North Dakota. 
4. I n  deciding whether costs o f  professional and consul t ing services 
used by a contractor are an allowable charge t o  a m i l i t a r y  contract ,  the 
government now w i l l  consider 'hhether the service can be performed more 
economically by employment rather than by contracting." That i s ,  the 
government now has considert51e au thor i ty  t o  decide whether one o f  i t s  
cont ractors  needs to  h i r e  an outside consultant ra ther  than a permanent 
employee. 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  of the consultant. 
The government a lso had assumed the au thor i ty  t o  review the 
5 .  Help-wanted advert is ing i s  not an allowable cost  i f  i t  i s  I n  co lor .  
Adver t is ing f o r  employees, i f  i t  i s  t o  be an allowable cost, must be 
-...r. L,..'.-,,* 1 1  
,-.11 . i n  advance. 
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Moreover, the Pentagon is currently reviewing the Procurement 
Regulation to determine "what actions on the part of the Government are 
necessary to assure that compensation paid to contractor employees 
performing on government contracts i s  reasonable.I'l2 
for increased governmental involvement in private business decision-making 
appears to be a long continuing one, 
LONG-RUN IMPACTS ON THE P R I V A T E  SECTOR 
Clearly, the trend 
The close, continuing relationship of the major, specialized government 
contractors to the governmental establishment is resulting in some long- 
term and undesirable structural impacts on this segment of private industry. 
Numerous specific indications are available o f  the limited entrepreneurial 
actions of these government-oriented corporations. 
shipbuilding companies on government contracts and subsidies is well known; 
it has resulted in that industry's failure to undertake new product develop- 
ment on its own or otherwise effectively to compete in the open world market. 
The dependence of the 
Similarly, the aerospace industry generally has made only halfhearted 
efforts to utilize its much vaunted engineering and systems analysis 
capability to penetrate commercial markets. Most o f  these attempts have 
been on a very small scale or were abandoned when substantial private risk 
capital was required. 
reacted passively to the developments, mainly curtailing their operations 
and waiting for government proposals to bid on civil ian agency work on a 
cost-plus basis. 
During the 1963-64 defense cutbacks, these companies 
The most conspicuous exception to this lack of entrepreneurship and 
willingness to bear risks in commercial markets is the Boeing Company. 
During the past decade, that company has invested several hundred million 
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d o l l a r s  o f  i t s  own funds i n  commercial a i r c r a f t  development, w i t h  considerable 
success. 
bulk of Boeing's cost of developing a commercial supersonic a i r l i n e r ,  that  
would represent a re tu rn  t o  the long-term trend o f  greater governmental r i s k -  
bear i ng . 
However, should the Federal Government decide to  finance the great 
This question o f  the long-term impacts o f  the governmental re la t i onsh ip  
on the p r i va te  contractors can be examined by comparing the major government- 
oriented, high-technology companies w i th  other large i ndus t r i a l  corporations 
o f  approximately s im i la r  size. The r e s u l t s  are qu i te  reveallng. The 
comparison indlcates tha t  the government-oriented companies possess important, 
measurable cha rac te r i s t i cs  which d i f f e r  from those o f  commercially-orlented 
i ndus t r i a l  corporations and that these di f ferences have been increasing 
i n  recent years. This would seem to  support the contention that i t  i s  the 
special ized, RM) - intensive contractors who are drawing closer t o  the 
Government and not, as Professor Galbrai th contends, large corporations as 
a who1 e . 
The fo l low ing  s i x  companies were selected because t h e i r  contracts from 
the Department o f  Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administrat ion 
were estimated t o  be i n  excess o f  three-quarters o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  sales volume 
In  1965: 
General Dynamics Corp., McOonnell Corp., Grumman A i r c r a f t  Engineering Corp., 
and Thlokol Chemical Corp. 
examples o f  the high-technology, government-oriented corporation as there 
are data avai lable. I n  many other cases, necessary s t a t i s t i c s  on large 
government contractors cannot be obtained because the organizations are 
subsidiar ies o r  d i v i s ions  o f  corporate conglomerates that  only release 
NO:-??I American Aviat ion, Inc., Lockheed A i r c r a f t  Corporation, 
These s i x  companies cons t i t u te  about as many 
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f inanc ia l  information on the t o t a l  company (e.9. Mart in-Marietta, L i t t o n  
Industr ies, and Textron.) 
A six-company c iv i l ian-or ien ted  sample was chosen on the basis o f  the 
s i m i l a r i t y  o f  sales volume i n  1965 between these f i rms and the companies 
i n  the sample o f  govet nment contractors. Generally, they were adjacent 
f i rms on the Fortune l i s t  o f  the 500 largest i ndus t r i a l  corporations i n  
1965, 
the year. The general industry sample cmntained the fo l lowing business 
f irms: National Dairy Products Corp., Firestone T i r e  and Rubber Corp., 
General Foods, Inc., Aluminum Company o f  America, Colgate-Polmolive Co., 
and Purex, Inc. 
Each gre :p reported an aggregate sales volume o f  $7.3 b i l l  ion f o r  
The two samples were compared, f o r  the years 1962-1965, and also for 
the per iod 1952-1955, on the bas i s  o f  standard f inanc ia l  ra t ios,  t rad t t i ona l  
stockholder factors,  and cap i ta l  structure. A span o f  years was chosen 
i n  each case to reduce the e f fec t  of  e r r a t i c  movements i n  ind iv idual  years. 
The resu l t s  o f  the analysis are contained i n  Table 1. It can be seen 
t h a t  government-oriented companies tend t o  operate on much smaller p r o f i t  
margins than do t yp i ca l  indus t r ia l  corporations -- 2.6 percent versus 4.6 
percent during the years 1962-1965. As a resu l t  o f  the large amounts of 
government-supplied cap i ta l ,  which are not re f lec ted  on the books o f  these 
companies, the government contractors report  a f a r  higher r a t i o  o f  cap i ta l  
turnover (i.e. d o l l a r s  o f  sales per d o l l a r  of net worth) dur ing 1962-65 0- 
6.8 times versus 2.3 times. 
t h e i r  lower p r o f i t  margins, 
as a percent of stockholder's investment) was considerably higher -0 17.5 
percent versus 10.6 percent during 1962-65. 
Their 5tr'ler turnover ra tes more than o f f s e t  
Hence, t h e i r  re tu rn  on net worth (net p r o f i t s  
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Table 1 
COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIALLY ORIENTED CORPORATIONS 
Average o f  Sample o f  
Government Contractors Comercial  Firms 
Average o f  Sample o f  
Financial  Character ist ics 1962-65 1952-55, %52-55 1962-62 
Prof i t  margin on sales 2.6% 3.0% 
Capital  turnover 6 . 8 ~  6. l x  
Return o f  net w r t h  17.5% 18.6% 
4.5% 4.6% 
2 . 9 ~  2 . 3 ~  
13.0% 10.6% 
Investor Evaluation 
Price/earnings mu l t i p le  17.9 7.3 10.7 20.6 
Bond r a t i n g  (Moody's) Ba-Baa Ba-Baa A-Aa A-Aa 
Source: Moody's Indus t r ia l  Manual, 1952-55 and 1962-65; company 
annual reports, 1952-55, 1962-65. 
Moreover, the differences between the two samples widened over the 
past decade. 
to the general indus t r ia l  sample dur ing the e a r l i e r  per iod (1952-55) 
than dur ing the more recent years analyzed (1962-65), 
The sales margins o f  the government contractors were c loser  
The same changes 
are not iceable f o r  cap i ta l  turfiover and re tu rn  on investment. 
Despite the greater r e l a t i v e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  the evaluat ion by the 
stock market o f  the Government-oriented corporations has been less 
favorable than o f  large business f i rms as a whole. 
from the inherent i n s t a b i l i t y  of  the government market and the h i s t o r i c a l  
v o l a t i l i t y  o f  the fortunes o f  indiv idual  contractors as spec i f i c  p ro jec ts  
phase i n  and then phase out. The r e l a t i v e l y  low payout r a t i o  ( the propor- 
This  resul ts,  In par t ,  
t ion  o f  net income which i s  disbursed t o  stockholders i n  the form of cash 
dividends) may also have an adverse e f fec t .  Ref lect ing these factors,  
earnings of  the government contractors tend t o  be more f u l l y  discounted, 
-1  2- 
as shown by lower/price earnings mul t ip les -- 10.9 versus 20.6 f o r  the 
per iod 1962-65. The resu l ts  f o r  1952-55 were not subs tan t ia l l y  d i f f e ren t .  
S imi lar  investor reluctance towards these high-technology, government- 
or iented corporations i s  evident i n  the bond market. O f  the s i x  f i rms 
which composed the general industry sample, during the per iod 1962-65, four 
were able to issue bonds w i th  a ra t ing  o f  e i t he r  A o r  Aa (according t o  the 
standard Moody's bond rat ings) ;  one chose not t o  issue bonds a t  a l l ;  and 
the l a s t  placed i t s  bonds pr iva te ly .  
Out o f  the s i x  companies i n  the government sample, on ly  one issued 
bonds on the market and these had a r e l a t i v e l y  low r a t i n g  o f  Ba and Baa. 
One o f  the f i rms placed i t s  bonds p r i va te l y ,  whi le the other four d i d  not 
issue any a t  a l l .  Again, the resu l ts  f o r  1952-55 were s imi lar .  These 
comparisons suggest tha t  i t  i s  much easier f o r  c iv i l ian-or ien ted  f i rms 
to enter the bond market on favorable terms. 
t h i s  r e f l e c t s  the greater degree o f  r i s k  which i s  imputed t o  bonds issued 
by government contractors. 
I t  w u l d  be expected tha t  
An attempt to sum up the growing di f ferences between government- 
o r ien ted  and commercially-oriented corporations y ie lds  a paradox, but 
perhaps not an unexpected one. 
on the v o l a t i l e  government customer resu l t s  simultaneously i n  higher 
average p r o f i t a b i l  i t y  and lower investor interest ,  
ar ises mainly because o f  the f ree prov is ion of working and f i xed  capi ta l .  
The lowar stock and bond market evaluat ion comes about, i n  p e r t  a t  least ,  
because of the great v o l a t i l i t y  o f  government requirements and, hence, o f  
the  fortunes o f  ind iv idual  contractors. 
The close dependence o f  the contractors 
The higher p r o f i t a b i l  f t y  
Another fac to r  inf luencing investor a t t i t udes  may be the i n a b i l i t y  
o f  these companies t o  operate successfully i n  commercial markets because 
o f  t h e i r  preoccupation w i th  meeting government requirements, Cer ta in ly  
other large contractors -- such as General E lec t r i c ,  R.C.A. ,  Honeywell, 
General Motors, Ford, and A.T. E T. -- which receive the bu lk  o f  t h e i r  
sales from consumer and indus t r i a l  markets encounter more favorable 
investor a t t i tudes.  With reference t o  Professor Galbra i th 's  forecast 
of  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  the disappearance o f  tha t  l i n e  between the mature 
corporat ion and the state, the market a t  least  seems t o  d is t ingu ish  
increasingly c l e a r l y  between government-or 
corporations. 
IMPORTANT P O L I C Y  I M P L I C A T I O N S  
ented and market-oriented 
Recent periods o f  defense cutbacks 9a.e r i s e  t o  demands f o r  u t i l i z i n g  
the unique research and development and systems management capab i l i t i es  o f  
m i l i t a r y  contractors i n  c i v i l i a n  publ ic  sector a c t i v i t i e s .  Given another 
reduct ion i n  m i l i t a r y  spending i n  the near future,  such act ion may be an 
e f f e c t i v e  short-term means o f  preventing unemployment i n  defense areas. 
However, as a matter o f  long-term pub l ic  po l icy ,  would i t  be wise f o r  the 
na t ion  to  expand tha t  branch of industry which increasingly develops the 
charac ter is t i cs  and mental i ty of a government arsenal? To a considerable 
degree, the large government R I D  contractors r a r e l y  r i s k  large amounts of  
t h e i r  own resources i n  new undertakings, but p r i m a r i l y  respond t o  the 
i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  the governmental customer. 
a Val i d  profit-maximizing solut ion f o r  these companies, but i t  hardly 
This  course o f  act ion may be 
promotes the r isk-bearing and entrepreneurship which i s  charac ter is t i c  o f  
p r i v a t e  enterprise. Should w e  encourage these companies t o  expand in to  
c i v l l i a n  government markets i n  the same type o f  protected or insulated 
-14- 
environment? 
encouraging, o r  a t  least  not discouraging, the eventual movement o f  RU) 
personnel, f a c i l i t i e s ,  funds and other resources t o  those other industr ies 
which are more accustomed t o  operatlng i n  a commercial business rather 
than a government environment? 
arms reduction o r  disarmament would be the opportunity t o  reduce i f  not 
el iminate t h i s  "semi-nationalized" branch o f  the American economy. 
Even i n  extended cold war  periods, the Ilconvergencell tendencies o f  
O r  should mote emphasis be given t o  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
Perhaps, an added and unnoticed benef i t  o f  
government contractors may need t o  be held i n  check i n  order t o  maintain 
t h s t r  present high r a t e  o f  technological innovation which forms such a 
baslc p a r t  o f  the Nation's natlonal secur i ty  base. An important j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the government-oriented 
tha t  i t  Is I n  a p o s i t i o n  most read i l y  t o  undertake s c i e n t i f i c  and technological 
Innovation. Yet, innovation i s  l i k e l y  t o  come f o r t h  only if there remains 
some r i s k  o f  not innovating due t o  competit ive pressures. Such pressures 
may erne from e x i s t i n g  government suppl iers as wel l  as from companies now 
or tsn ted  t o  commercial markets. 
(and hence pub1 i c l y  assisted) corporation i s  
The optimal i n  the government-suppl i e r  re lat ionship,  hence, may be 
subs tan t i a l l y  short o f  e i t h e r  arsenal izat ion o r  the informal contact o f  a 
free market. 
competence but enough uncertainty t o  prod some mutual p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the 
innovation process. 
The desired resul t  may be enough s t a b i l i t y  t o  assure technical 
Hence, i t  w u l d  appear that governmental procurement p o l i c i e s  and 
prac t lces  need to  be modified i n  order to  h a l t  the erosion o f  the basic 
entrepreneurial character o f  the f i r m s  that  undertake large-scale develop- 
montal programs f o r  government agencies. I n  any event, some second thoughts 
-15- 
may need to be given before we as a Nation agree t o  the almost u n c r i t i c a l  
demands f o r  extending the use o f  these government-oriented corporations to  
other pa r t s  o f  the publ ic  sector. 
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